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PREFACE
Thisworking paper is a draft of a chapter in a larger
manuscriptwhichis concerned with the timeseriesvariations in
fertility in the United States since 1920. Thischapterasks how
economicmodels of fertility aid our understanding of our demographic
history. Thus little attention is given here to the suitability of
economic models for the explanation of cross—sectional fertility
differentials.
I would like to thank Paul David for his valuable comments
on an earlier draft of this chapter.
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wCsECONOMIC THEORIESOFFERTILITY:
WHATDO THEYEXPLAIN? • by
Warren C. Sanderson
Stanford University
The economic theory of fertility, in its current state,
is a product of two broad strands of influence. One such strand can
be found in the works of Becker,1 Mincer2 and Willis.3 The other
strand winds its way through the works of Eastr1in.4 The Becker— and
Easterlin—type approaches are fundamentally quite distinct, not in the
least part because of the differences in what the authors try to
accomplish. The main thrust of Becker's work (and that of his followers)
is to show how economic models may be used to aid our understanding of
fertility variations and differentials. The spirit of the Becker—type
analysis, is the spirit of the economic theorist who is demonstrating
the strength and breadth of the analytical framework by showing how it
may be used to analyze a complex and unresolved problem. Easterlin came
to the study of fertility with a quite different background, that of an
economic historian. The problem for Easterlin was to understand fertility
variations within a historical context. Thus, for Easterlin, the main
problem was to provide a framework in which to comprehend the available
information on the variations in fertility over time. The spirit of the
Easterlin—type analysis is the spirit of the economic historian who finds
• himself compelled to modify economic models and concepts for the purpose
of understanding some observed behavior. Of course, there is much in
common between these two approaches.
I—2—
One problem which is shared by both approaches to the
economics of fertility is how to account for the inverse relationships
between fertility and income which are so frequently observed.5 If
the relationships were always negative there would be some temptation
to label children as "inferior goods", but in reality the relationships
vary in sign.6 Furthermore, treating children as If they were inferior
goods does not explain observed behavior, but rather just gives it a name
after the fact. So economists have shied away from assuming that children
could be viewed as inferior goods and have regarded the negative associations
between income, and fertility as something which must be explained in other
terms. Thus all the models of fertility discussed below have some mech-
anism which can transform a nominally positive association between income
and fertility into a negative one.
The Economic Theory of Fertility Before Becker: Leibenstein
Becker is usually considered the father of the contemporary
economic theory of fertility although his work was not the first to
analyze the demand for children within the framework economic theory.
His work was predated at least by the contributions of Leibenstein7 and
Okun.8 What differentiated Becker's work from that of Leibenstein's
and Okun's was Becker's use of the well known demand theory approach
to the problem of fertility without the introduction of ad hoc or unfamiliar
notions into the structure of model in order to explain the possibility
of a negative relationship between icnome and fertility.
The essence of Leibenstein's contribution is presented in theS
followingquotation.—3—
Our central notion is that people behave in the same
way as they would if they applied rough calculations to the
problem of determining the number of births they desire.
And such calculations would depend on balancing the satis-
factions or utilities to be derived from an additional birth
as against the "cost," both monetary and psychological,
of having an additional child. We distinguish among three
types of utility to be derived from an additional birth
and two types of cost. The types of utility are: (1) the
utility to be derived from the child as a 'consumption
good,' namely, as a source of personal pleasure to the parents;
(2) the utility to be derived from the child as a productive
agent, that is,atsome point the child maybeexpected to
enterthe labor force and contribute to family income; and
(3) the utility derived from the prospective child as a
potential source of security, eitherin old age or otherwise.
Thecosts of having anadditional child can bedivided
into direct andindirectcosts. By direct costs we refer
to the conventional current expenses of maintaining the
child, such as feeding andclothinghim at conventional
standards until the point is reached when the child is self—
supporting. By indirect costs we refer to the opportunities
foregonedue to the existence of an additional child. These
arerepresented by such lost opportunities as the inability
of mothers to work if they must tend to children, lost
earnings during the gestation period, or the lessened mobility
of parents with large family responsibilities.9
Many of the ideas subsequently developed in the economic theory
of fertility can be found in Leibenstein's work. Indeed, those para-
graphs suggest at least one line of approach which has not yet been
explored. Leibenstein's main interest in fertility in his 1957 volume,
was why fertility declined as per capita income rose. He summarized




In the Leibenstein model fertility fell as per capita income
rose for two main reasons. First, as per capita income increases there
are associated changes in the structure of economic activities which
tend to reduce the value of children to their parents. Leibenstein
suggests that the main causes of this decline are the decreasing utility
of children of a given order in providing old—age security for their
parents and the decreasing potential of children contributing to family
income through work activities. On the other side of the coin, Leibenstein
views the costs of children of a given order as increasing as per capita
income increases because tithe style in which a child is maintained
depends on the position and income of the parents." Leibenstein also
thought that the indirect costs of children of a given order would rise
because he considered "opportunities for (parents) engaging in productive
or in various time—consuming activities as likely to grow as income
increases .
Leibenstein'sanalysis is focused on explaining variations
in fertility over time. It suggests that students of fertility pay
attention to two broad sets of forces in determining fertility movements.
The first is the set of structural transformations which accompany the
rIse in per capita income and which (according to Leibenstein) decrease
the value of children to their parents. The second is a set of forces
which increases the cost of children as income increases. Thus, the
Leibenstein model differs from a simple model of constrained optimiza-
tion in that par capita income affects fertility through a variety of
mechanisms in addition to its effect on the budget constraint. Leibenstein
solved the problem of explaining the negative secular relationship
between income and fertility by positing that the utility function—6—
•)
shiftswith changes in per capita income and that the price of children
varies with family income. In the Leibenstein model secular increases
in income are associated with changes in tastes and changes in the
relative price of children which dominate the pro—natal effect of income
increases and cause the observed negative relationship. I think it
is fair to say that the Leibenstein model represented, in somewhat
moreformal terms, the main lines explanation of the secular decline
infertility which were widely accepted at the timeof his writing.
AnExplanation of FluctuationS in American Fertility: The Work of Easterlin
Like Leibenstein's ideas, the main focus of Easterlin's
work has been on fertility variations over time. Easterlin has made
a number of contributions to the economic analysis offertility12,
but in this chapter we shallbe eclectic andtreat only those which
aredirectly relevantto the present discussion. Whereas Leibenstein
considered the problem of fertility variations in the context of
developing countries, the works of Easterlin, which will be discussed
here, deal with fertility fluctuations over time in the United States.
In 1961, Easterlin proposed an explanationforthe American baby boom13
which suggested that the baby boom was a manifestation of the same sort
of forces which, in an earlier era, had produced long swings in migration.
In 1966, Easterlin suggested an integrated explanation of both the baby
boom and the following fertility decline.14
In the earlier article, Easterlin focused on the time profile
of white fertility which he disaggregated into the time paths of the
fertility of foreign—born whites, rural native whites, and urban native—7—
)
white.He found through this process, that most of the temporal decline
in fertility in white fertility in the United States was due to the
declining fertility of foreign—born whites, the declining fertility of
rural native whites, and the rural—urban shift. The fertility of urban
native whites decreased only slightly from 1885—89 to 1925—29. After
1925—29, however, urban white fertility shows a marked alteration from
its relative constancy of the previous 40 years. The great depression
caused a substantial decrease in fertility and the postwar period,
through to the middle '50s, saw an unprecendented fertility increase.
Easterlin suggests a separate explanation for the fertility
patterns of each of the three groups. For our present purposes it is
sufficient to examine his explanation of the course of urban native
fertility. In order to explain these fertility changes Easterlin concentrates
on the fertility of young people. Easterlin's explanation of changes
in the fertility of urban native whites hinges on the interaction of two
factors: changes in the aggregate unemployment rate andchangesin the
rateof growth of the total white male population 20—29. Both increases
in the aggregate unemployment rate and the rate of growth of the total
whitemale population are thought to be negatively associated with
fertility changes. The changes in these twofactorstaken together
broadly reflect changes in the economic well—beingof young people, if
weabstractfrom the secular upward trend in income. This explanation
offertility changes is supported by evidence shown inFigure 2.There
is can be seen that changes in the unemployment rate and changes in
therate of growth of the total white male population were inversely
I— 7a— .
Figure2
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associatedbefore the Great Depression. This inverse relationship
is caused by a negative association between the unemployment rate in the
United States and international migration to the United States.15
According to Easterlin, the rapid response of migration to changes in
labor market conditions which prevented pronounced cyclical movements
in the economic well—being of young adults was the reason for the relative
constancy of urban native white fertility before the Depression of the
1930's. After the statutory restriction of international migration in
the early 1920's the stage was set for the native white population to bear
the full brunt of economic fluctuations. In
particular, the baby boom period of the 'fifties was a period of relatively
low unemployment rates and a relatively low growth rate of the white
male population 20—29 because of the low fertility in the 1930's. The
combination of these two circumstances was unusual and Easterlin suggested
that it was this fortuitous combination which caused the baby boom.
In his later article on the baby boom, Easterlin added another
element to his explanation of fertility changes. Easterlin argued that
it was incorrect to create economic models of fertility based on the
assumption that tastes remained fixed. He argued that young adults
become acquainted with a certain level of consumption when they are
teenagers in their parents' households and that this level of consumption
affects their tastes andaspirations.When the young adults become
married,so the argument goes, the tastes and aspirations formed in their
adolescence remainwiththem. Ift1irincome is such that their aspi-
rationsare satisfied they will have higher fertility than if they are
struggling to attain their desired level of consumption)6Thus,Easterlin
psuggests not only that we study changed in the economic position of
young people in order to understand changes in fertility, but that we
also study changes in their economic position relative to that of their
parents.
Easter].in presented a table to support the intergenerational
relative income hypothesis, which showed the relationship between
median family incomes of families whose heads were 14—24 ina given
year with those of families whose heads were 35—44 five years earlier.
Th table contained data for the years 1953—1962. Table 1 shows similar
data for the years 1953—1972 and these data together with theage specific
fertility rates of married women 15—19 and 20—24 lagged one year are
plotted in Figure 3A.
The peak of the income ratio is in 1956 and the ratio declines
rapidly to a local trough in 1963. The two years of marked increase
which follow 1963 give way to a continued decline through 1972. Thus,
at first glance, the income ratio series does not seem to do well in
explaining the fertility of young women. While both the lagged age—
specific marital fertility rates and the income ratios have local peaks
in 1956, the income ratio declines through 1963, while the laggedage—
specific martial fertility rate for women 15—19 is higher in 1960 than
in 1957 and the rate for women 20—24 is higher in 1959 than in 1957. After
1963, the three series hardly seem related at all. In Figure 3—B, the
intergenerational relative income ratio and the marriage rate for un-
married women 15—44 are plotted. It can be seen from that figure that




apparentlythey are more closely related than the income ratio and
age—specific fertility rates. However, the relationship between the
income ratio and the marriage rate is not so close as to obviate the
need for further discussion. This is not the place for a complete
test of the intergenerational relative income hypothesis. Here we
simply want to suggest the possibility that, to the extent that inter-
generational relative Income Is an important determinant of fertility,
its impact is chiefly through its influence on marriage rates and only
secondarily through it influence on the completed fertility of married
women.
It would be quite naive to believe that all fertility
variations could be understood with reference to a single income ratio
I andthis Is not what Easterlin intended. For one thing, contraceptive
technology was changing rapidly in the '60's and this could possibly
account for some of the deviations between the income ratio series
and the lagged age—specific marital fertility series in the middle of
the decade. A balanced view of the matter would suggest that the inter-
generational relative income effect may be quite important in under-
standing fertility changes, but that a definitive test of that hypo-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Median Real Income of Families with Head Aged 14—24 Divided
by Median Real IncomeofFamilies with Head Aged 35—44, Five
Years Earlier; 1953—1972.
(income figures for families with head aged 35—44 are three
year averages centered at indicated date)






















Source: 1947—1964: Trends in the Income of Families and Persons in
the United States, by Mary F. Henson, U. S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Technical Report 17, USGPO, Washington, D. C.
1967, Table 3.
1965—1972: Current Population Reports, P—60, various issues.— 11—
Easterlin,like Leibenstein, views tastes as changing inan
antinatal direction as income increases. At firstglance, this might
seem to be a noneconomic explanation of fertility variation.However,
the Easterlin—Fuchs intergenerational relative incomehypothesis puts
economIcsback into the picture by claiming that economicscanaid in
theunderstandingof intergeperationa]. taste differences.
Becker's Economic Theory of Fertility: LeibensteinFormalized?
In 1960, Becker formally applied demandtheory to task of
understanding fertility.17 The model suggested by Becker dealt witha
single consumer andmay be written as follows:
ModelI: The Becker Model
MaximizeU =f(n,e, s)
subject to I =nep+ ps
where f is autitity function, n is the numberof children, e is the
averagereal expenditure per child,18pis a price index for the child
expenditure bundle, s is an index of the quantity ofeverything else
consumed by the houshold,p5 is aprice index for s ,andIis
moneyincome. Thus, Inthe Becker model the utility function is defined
over the number of children, the average real expendituresper child, and
the quantity of everything else. The distinctionbetween and e— 12— .
isvery Important for Becker's argument. He notes that it is quite
plausible that increases in income are associated with increases in the
average real expenditures per child, but that this does not by itself
indicate that the cost of children rises with Income. Becker wrote:
A change in the cost of children Is a change in the cost
of children of given quality, perhaps due to a change in the
price of food or education. .. Onewould not say that the price
of cars has risen over time merely because more people now buy
Cadillacs and other expensive cars. A change in price has to
be estimated from indexes of the price of a given quality.
Secular changes in real income and other variables have
induced a secular increase in expenditures on children, often
interpreted as a rise in the cost of children. The cost of
children may well have risen ... butthe increase in expendi-
ture on children is no evidence of such rise since the quality
of children has risen. Today children are better fed, housed,
and clothed, and in increasing numbers are sent to nursery schools,
camps, high schools, and colleges. For the same reason, the
price of children to rich parents is the same as that to poor
parents even though rich parents spend more on children. The
rich simply choose higher quality children as well as higher
qualities of other goods.
Armed with the distinction between cost and expenditure, Becker
attacked Lelbenstein and others for assuming that the cost of children
necessarily rose with income. He argued that it was preferable to make
ananalogy between children andconsumer durables. In the case of
consumerdurables, people cannotonly choose the quantity of these
itemstheywish to purchase, but also, to some extent, the amountof
money they wish to spend on each unit. Beckerclaimed that in the world of
consumerdurables quality andquantityincome elasticities tend to be
positivewith the former exceeding the latter and, arguing by analogy, he
claimed that this would also be true for the demand for children, were
thereno contraceptive costs.— 13—
Becker'sdistinction between expenditure andcostwas quite
persuasive and for 13 years after Becker's initital article on fertility
most economists working in the field were convinced that "the price of
children to rich parents is the same as that topoor parents even though
20 rich parents spend more on children.However, in 1973, Becker and Lewis
discovered that this statement waä an obiter dictum and nota true impli-
cation of the Becker modal. Indeed, income changes generallyproduced
endogeneous relative price changes in that model whose effects had not
been previously analyzed. In analyzing these induced relativeprice changes
Becker and Lewis found that Becker had beenwrong in his earlier article.
They wrote:
This price effect, however, does offer a correction to
the argument advanced by Becker (1960), and followed bymany
others, that the price of children is the same for the rich as
for the poor (aside from the cost—of—time argument), even
though the rich choose more expensive children. The relevant
price of children with respect to their number is higher for
the. rich precisely because they choose more expensive children.
Similarly, the relevant price of cars, houses, or other goods
is higher r the rich because they choose more expensive
varieties.
In some regrds the Becker—Lewis article in 1973 brings us
full circle to Leibenstein's 1957 arguments, albeit witha considerable
increase in the level of analytic sophistication. Nonetheless, the
initial Becker article still has some appeal and it is difficult to
accept the proposition that the prices of goods are higher for the wealthy
than for the poor just because the wealthy purchase higherquality goods.
Are the price of automobiles, houses, children and othergoods really
higher for the rich thai for the poor? In order to discuss this question
let us consider two alternative models.
p— 14—
ModelI: The Becker Model
MaximizeU =f(n,e,s)
Subject to I =pane+ p5s
where the symbols are defined as above on page lL
Model II: A Model of Expenditures on Each Child
Maximize U =g(e1,e2,...,e,s)
Subject to I =pe1+ pe2 + ...+pem +
whereg is a utility function, ej (j1, ..., m)is the real expenditure
on the jth child, s is a quantity index of everything else consumed
by the household, PC is a price index for the child expenditure
bundle22,p5 is a price index for s,Iis money income, and mis
thebiologically determined maximum number of children a couple can
have. If the couple has n children, then e =e =... = e=0. n+ln+2 m
Themain difference between the Becker Model and ModelII
isthat in the second model the real expenditure of eachchild
is treated as a separate argument in the utility function. In Beker's
model these arguments are aggregated together into the number of children,
and the average real expenditure per child. Thus,
parents are assumed to be indifferent between the sItuation in which they
have two children with a real expenditure of $10,000 on the first and $2
on the second and the situation in which the parents have two children with
a real expenditure of $5,001 on each of them. No such assumption is made
in Model II. Neither of these models has any implications for the number
of children or real expenditures on them as it is written. In order to— 15
derive some implications it is customary to assume that all the arguments
in the utility functions are normal goods.23With these additional
assumptions in mind let us consider the Becker model first.
It can be seen immediately that the Becker modelis not the
standard model of demand theory. There are severalvery importmnt
differences. First of all, thearguments of a utility function are
generally quantities of goods and services. In the Beckermodel, n
and s meet this criteria, but e doesnot because it represents an
average of quantities, the average being taken over anotherargument in
the utility function.Thisspecification leads to the other important
departure from the standard model; the budgetconstraint is not linear
in the arguments of the utility function. Theconsequences of these
differences can be seen most clearly when thefirst—order conditions for
a utility maximum are written down. They are
(1) f f f n a s
Ice
where k -fork =n,e, and s .Theshadow price of n in this
formulationispe andtheshadow price of e ispn .Notonly do
theshadow prices of n and echange with income, the shadow prices
are functionsof the arguments of the utility function.
Now int sense is it true that childrenare more expensive
to rich people than to poor people in the contextof the Becker model?
To answer this question, let ussuppose that, subject to the budget constraint
(2) i(l) =
Pane+ ps— 16—
(1)(1) (1) utility is maximized at the point (n ,e ,s ).Atthis point
let the shadow price of n be defined as ir(1)=peW and the shadow
price of e be defined as fleW =PcW
.Usingthese shadow prices,
the budget constraint may be rewritten as follows:
(3) =(l)(l)+ 11e0 + ps(
where R' = + PeWnW .Asin the standard analysis, holding
the shadow prices constant, equation 3 is linear in the arguments of the
(1) (2) utility function. Now let income increase from I to I .In
2) '1) this case there will exist an R >K' such that at the point
(n(2),e(2),s(2)) utility is maximized subject to the two constraints
(4) R2 (l)(2)+ir e(2) +
(2) (2') (2) (2) and(5)I = e+ ps
Since there are two constraints24 passing through point
(n(2),e(2),s(2)) there are two sets of shadow prices. The shadow prices
(1) (1) for n, e, andsalong equation 4 are '11e and
respectively. The shadow prices for n, e, andsalong equation 5 are
(2 (2) (2) (2) pe ), (=pn),andp8 respectively. Before we compare
shadow price ratios along the constraints, it is important to note that
Becker and Lewis believe that the pure income elasticity of demand for e
is greater than the pure income elasticity of demand for n. If this is
(2) (1) the case, e >e Now how do the relative shadow prices of n
n(2)








Therefore,the shadow price of n relative to the shadow price of e
(2) (2)(2) at point (n ,e ,s )alongequation 5 is greater than the shadow
(1)(1)(1) price of n relative to the shadow price of e at point (n ,e ,s )
alongequation 2. It is in this sense that Becker and Lewis mean that
children are more expensive to rich people than to poor people. However,
continuing the line of argument, there is another sense in which children
are more expensive for the rich than for the poor. The shadow prices of
both n and e relative to the price of a are higher at point
(2)(2)(2) (1) (1)(1)
(11,e ,s )alongequation 5 than at (n,e ,s )along
equation 2 even if the true incomeelasticityof demandforn is
25 greaterthan the true income elasticity of demand for e
The complications caused by the induced relative price effects
inthe Becker model contrast markedly with the simplicity of the analysis
of Model II, the model in which each child is treated separately.
Model II is formally identical to the standard model of demand theory and
therefore the first—order conditions for a maximum are:
g g
e2 e g8 (7) —= — . . . = — = — c'c 1c s
and (8) — forj =n+l,...,m,18 —
a•
where for I1,...,m, andwhereg = i i S S
andwhere n is the number of children in the family. In Model II
shadow prices are fixed parameters independent of income. Therefore, the
shadow prices are the same to rich and poor alike. There is no sense
in which the price of children or automobiles or houses, for that matter,
varies with income in this model.
Thus, it is the standard demand model which yields the assertion
that prices are invariant to income, whereas the original Becker model
itself leads to the Leibensteinian position taken on this question in the
Becker—Lewis 1973 article. Clearly, whether or not the price of children
varies with income depends upon the model chosen to represent the
decision—making process. The same is certainly true for houses, automobiles,
and other goods.
Now that there are two models proposed to explicate the same
phenomena, the question naturally arises: which model is preferable?
For those who would resolve this question by an empirical test
of the implications of the models, the absence of any testable implications
from the Becker model poses something of a problem. The Becker model
can accomodate virtually any fertility—income pattern, but it predicts
no particular association. Becker and Lewis have shown that even though
nand eareassumed to be normal goods,their observed elasticities
with respect to income may be negative. This can be seen inFigure 4,
where we have assumed that utility is initially maximized at the point
(1)(1)(1) . (3)(3)(3) (n ,e ,s )andgiven an increase in income at the point (n ,e ,s ).— 19—
Inthat figure the constraint K1K1 and the indifference curve U1U1
are both drawn holding the quantity of s consumed at s .Similarly
the constraint K2K2 and the indifference curve U2U2 are both drawn
(3) holding the quantity of s consumed at s
Figure 4 illustrates the case where fertility decreases with
income even though n is a normal good in the utility function. The
initial point which maximizes utility is at a2 , thepoint where
the budget constraint K1K1 and the indifference curve U11J1 are
tangent. With the increase in income the constraint may shift upward to
K2K2 which is tangent to U21J2 at point b2 .Clearlythe increase in
income in that representation causes fertility to decline. Nonetheless,
nisnot an inferior good. In order to show this, consider the straight
linea1a2a3 which is tangent to both U1U1 and K1K1 at a2
Shifting this line upward without changing its slope until it becomes
tangent to U2U2 we obtain the line a4a5a6 .Thepoint of tangency
between the line a4a5a6 andtheindifference curve is a5 .However,
a5 is above andtothe right of a2 indicating that holding relative
pricesconstant an increaseinincome would be associated with both an
increasein n and e .Essentially,the same argtunent canbe made
starting at anypointon either indifference curve. For example, let us
considerthe straight line b1b2b3 which is tangent to TJ2U2 and K2K2
at point b2 .Aparallel downward shift in that line such that the
resulting line is tangent to U1U1 ,yieldsthe line b4b5b6 .Clearly,
b2 is above and to the right of b5 again indicating that both n

































Inaddition to having no implications for the relationship
between income andfertility,the Becker model also has no implications
for the effects of market price changes on fertility. Changing p9
has a pure cross—substitution effect26 on n of unknown sign which is now
compoundedby an income effectofunknownsign.Decreasing p i
equivalent toincreasing income and increasing PSbut since both of
the latter two changes result in ambiguous changes In n ,evendecreasing
has no clear effect on fertility in the Becker model.27 Therefore,
since the Becker model has no implications for fertility it cannot
easily be falsified by observed data. Rather than providing implications
concerning fertility the Becker model provides a framework for the
analysis of fertility into which practically all observed data can fit.
There is one particularly interesting subtelty of the Becker
(1960) model that, as Becker and Lewis (1973) have shown, deserves
attention. In the context of the Becker mod.i,
the ordering of the observed income elasticities of demand for n and
e may be the reverse of the ordering of the true income elasticities
of demand for n and e Thus, we might observe that the income
elasticity of demand for e is greater than the income elasticity
of demand for n ,butnonetheless it may be the case that the true
income elasticity of demand for itexceedsthe true income elasticity
of demand for a .Onematter which isclearly implied bythe Becker
modelis that in dealing withthat model we mustbe cautious about
assumingthatthesigns or the ordering of trueIncomeelasticities is
identical to the signs or the ordering of observed income elasticities.
p— 22— .
Asa framework for the analysis, the Becker model tells its
user that he cannotlearn muchabout fertility fromsimplystudying income
andmarketprices. In order to understand even the direction in which
fertility responds to an economic change, the Becker model requires
quite a bit of information about the individuaTh tastes. Thus, the
framework of analysis suggested by Becker and Lewis is one in which
the differences in the structures of individuals' taste patterns are
crucial to an understanding of fertility differentials.
In contrast to the Becker model, in Model II Lhere are implications
for fertility of changes ir economic variables. The implications are
1. increasing (decreasing) income never causes fertility
to fall (rise) and may cause it to rise (fall).
2. decreasing (increasing) p never causes fertility to
fall (rise) and may cause it to rise (fall).
3. decreasing (increasing)p5 may cause fertility
either to rise or fall.
The first implication may be easily demonstrated. Let us suppose at some
initial income level IWutility is maximized with 3 children. In
(1) (1) (1) . (1) (1) other words, e
1
,e
2 and e are positive and e4,.. .
arezero. Asincome increases moremoney is spenton eachofthe
threechildren so that at least three children must be desiredafter the
incomeincrease. However,the family may choose to have even more
children after the income increase.This possibility is shown in Figure 5.— 23—
Figure5
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InFigure 5, at income level aa ,thefamily chooses not to have any
children, i.e., e1=O .However,increasing income to bb induces the
family to have their first child and e1 becomes positive.
A similar diagram can be used to illustratethesecond impli-
cation.When pdecreases fertility cannot fall because more is spent
oneach. existing child, but fertility may rise. This is shown in Fig. 6
again for the case where the family initially has no children. Given
the constraint aa ,e1is zero. Whenthe constraint shifts to ba ,
becauseof the decrease in ,thefamily is induced to have their
first child and e1 becomes positive. A decrease in p5 is equivalent
to an increase in income and an increasein p.Theincrease in c
income taken by itself could have a positive effect on fertility and )
theincrease in PCtaken by itself could have a negative ffect
on fertility and it is impossible to determine a priori which of the
two effects would dominate. Therefore, the effect of a change in p5
onfertilityis indeterininant.
Backer and Lewis proved, in the context of the Becker model,
that although n ,e,ands are assumedtobe normal goods, fl.
ore may decrease as income increases. In Model II, which
treatseach child separately, when the arguments of the utility function
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thisadded ambiguity in the Becker model concerning the effect of observed
income changes on fertility is a point in its favor because observed
fertility variations have indeed been both positively and negatively
associated with income. But some caution is suggested here. Any associ-
ations may be rationalized within a framework which does not restrict the
direction or magnitude of association. This is one reason economists have
chosen to assume children are not an inferior good and have reasoned,
therefore, that children ought to be treated in our models as if they were
consumer durables. If the Becker model of quantity—quality interaction
is appropriate for both children and consumer durables, then why do we
often observe negative income elasticities of ttdemandt for children,
whereas in the case of consumer durables positive observed income elas-
ticities are almost invariably observed. Within the context of the model
the answer could only be that tastes for children are really different
from tastes for durables. While this answer is better than no answer,
there will be those who would argue that the same answer could have
obtained without a model of quanity—quality interaction.
Before completing the. comparison of the Becker model with the
standard demand theory model of fertility, there are a few minor points
to be mentioned. In the Becker model, given fixed money income and fixed
prices, PC and p ,thevalues of n ,e,ands which maximize
the utiliity function need not be unique. This is shown in Figure 7.
In that figure it is assumed that utility is mazimized when the quantity












































both the constraint ab andtheindifference curveUU .Clearlya
multiplicity of solutions are possible in this case and, as itisdrawn,
utilityis maximized at points A, ,A2,andA3 .Thusfar we have
ignored this problem and we shall assume it away in the remainder of
thechapter.
another minor point is that in the Becker modelthere is a
qualitydimension in only one of the two goods, children. Adding a
quality dimension to the other good complicates the model considerably and
weakens whatever hope. there wasofever putting the Becker model to
an empirical test.28 Another aspect of the Becker model is that, although
bothn and e are asstmied to be normal goods,even their product,27 —
I
totalreal expenditures on children (cne),neednot be normal with
respect to observed income changes. It is possible, in the Becker model,
for total real expenditures on children to decrease with an increase
in income29 while in Model II total real expenditures on childrenmust
increase when income increases.
Inthe end, the a priori choice between the Becker model and
the alternative model boils down to the question of how relevantone
believes the form of quality—quantity interaction (specified in the
Becker model) to be in the case of fertility decisions. Model II,
where relative prices do not change with income, is certainly easierto
analyze and manipulate, but it treats each child as a separate entity
just like each item in the household's consumption basket. Model II,
which is, in fact, the standard demand theory model, thus fails to
reflect certain sociological or psychological constraintsupon the
freedom of a family to select a "consumption mix."
Ironically in capturing the influence of suchconstraints upon fert-
ility decisions, the Becker model comes closerto recognizing the range of con-
siderations which underlay Leibenstein'streatment of fertility. One source of
quantity—quality interaction, for example, may lie in parents' desire
to make the same real expenditures on each child. In today's environ-
ment inthe United States of small families in which the childrenare
relativelyclosely spaced, it seems plausible to believe that real
expenditures per child do not differ much across children in the
same family. This would perhaps justify treating theaverage real
expenditure per child as a separate argument of the utility function ——28-
it would be an index of the family's (uniform) child—rearing style.
Taking a more historical view, however, there seems to be reasons to
doubt that expenditures per child were equalized across children in
the family. Inheritance practices, of course, varied across time and
space, but it was not unusual for a farm to be divided unequally between
a farmer's heirs.3° In the United States earlier in this century it
was not uncommon for some children of the family to be sent to work
so that other children (brothers, usually) could be sent to school.3'
Therefore, it is not clear that observed regularities in behavior at
one time are most usefully treated as sociological or psychological
constraints operating on utility functions for all times. If there
is a modern social convention which influences parents to spend equally
on each child, it certainly owes much to the small size of the modern
family. To accept the convention as operating at all times can add
an element to circularity to any explanation of the decline in fertility
over time. An appropriate historical model should be able to account
for diversity in expenditures per child and the possible convergence
of these expenditures over time. In this regard, Model II, being more
general, must be judged to be preferable to the Becker model as a frame-
work for analysis.
The Household_Viewed as a Production Structure: The Willis Model of
Fertility Decisions
The analysis of household fertility decisions recently advanced
32
by Willisrepresents the combination and development of twolinesofp
— 29—
approach,both suggested by Becker. The resultisthe most sophisticated
and powerful model of fertility choice generally known to economists.
Willis combined the Becker model of fertility discussed abgve with the
concepts of household production and time allocation pioneered by Muth33
and Becker.34 The twothreads,however, can exist separately or in
combination with other strands of thought. Becker and Lewis35 have
shown that it is possible to analyze quantity—quality interactions in
the Becker model without considering the structure of household pro-
duction and below it will be shown that the structure of household
production maybeusefully placed in a model without the specific form
36 of quantity—quality interaction envisioned in the Becker model.
The structure of the Willis model is as follows:
Model III: The Willis Model
(9) Maximize U =f(n,e,s) utility function
(10) subject to s =G(t,x) household produc—
(11) c H(t,x) tion functions
(12) ec/n definition of e
(13) T t+t+t wife's timeconstraint
(14)
V+wttL= x) budget constraint
Assumptions: (i) G( )and H( ) arehomogeneous of degree one.
(ii) H( )ismore intensive in the wife's time than G( )•37
(iii) n,e, andsare allnormal goods.•'\
wheref( )isa utility function; G( )isa household production
function whose output s is considered as a composite of all activities
not associated with the production of child services, c; t5 is the
wife'stime spentin the production of s and x5 isthe quantity
of goods used in producing s ; H( )isa household production function
whose output is childservices, c ; tc and Xare the quantities
of the wife's time and market goods respectively used in the production
of childservices; e is the average quantity of childservices per
child;38 T is the total amount of time the wife has available during
the period in question39 and t, is the amountoftime she spendsin
thelabor market; V is total family money income during the period
in question excluding the wife's earnings in the labor market; w' is
the wife's wage rate if she participates in the labor market4° andp,
is the market price of the pruchased good x
Afew words of comment are necessary here. Clearly, the Willis
model is not a complete model of fertility in the sense that there are
many plausible additions wich might still be introduced, even though as
it stands it constitutes a significant elaboration of the original Becker
model. For the purpose of creating models which have analytic implica-
dons, it is certainly important to abstract from all but the most impor-
tant aspects of the problem, but this does not mean that the specification
of the model is beyond question. Rather than probing the model for those
assumptions which are crucial and for those which are not, let us proceed
to a brief discussion of the model's properties. After the model has
been put through its paces we shall return to the question of whether— 31—
p
itwould haveperformed any differently had its assumptions been
altered.
At first glance the only portion of the Willis modelwhich
resembles the Becker model is the utility function. However, their
similarities runconsiderablydeeper. Since C and H are homogeneous






where among other restrictions on they are all homogeneous
of degree zero.42 If the wife is in the labor forcewe know that:
(19) t=T—t—t#0
£ C S
andsubstituting this value oft into the budget constraint yields
(20) V +w'T=w't+ p x+w't + p x Cxc Sxs
If the wife is not in the labor market multiplyingequation (13) by
her "shadow wage rate", w*, and adding theresulting equation to equa-
tion (14) yields
(21) V + w*T =w*t+ p x + w*t + p x cxc Sxs
Equation (20) is the constraint binding the household If the wife is in
the labor force and equatIon (21) is the constraint if she isnot.
I-32-
Substituting equations (15) —(18)first into equation (20) and then into
equation (21) we obtain
(22) V + w'T =s(w'g(w',p )+pg(w',p ))+c(w'h(w',p)+ph(w',P))
and
(23) V + w*T =s(w*g(w*,p)+pg(w*,p ))+c(w*h(w*,p)+ph(w*,p))
If we write
(24) I=V+wT





and making use of equation (12)
(28) I ps + pane
which is identical in form to the budget constraint in the Becker model.43
Thus both the Willis model and the Becker model may be written
(29) Maximize U =f(n,e,s)
(30) subject to I = +
pcne
However, in the Becker model p5
,pand I are exogenous, whereas in
44 the Willis model they are endogenous.There is somewhat less than meets the eye in this simi-
larity between the Becker and Willis models because the budget constraint
in the Willis model is really a combination of one constraint which is
binding when the wife is in the labor market and one which is binding
when she is not.45 This situation is shown In Figure 8.
Figure 8
The curve c'as' Is the production possibilities frontier associated with
equations Q.O. (1l. Q.3 and (14). The nonlinear portion c' a shows the
situation In which the wife is not working in the labor market and the
linear portion as' shows the situation in which she is working in the
labor market. The cause of this rather unusual production possibilities
curve may be stated simply. When the wife participates in the labor mar-
ket her wage rate is fixed (by assumption) at w' regardless of howmany
hours she works and thereforep5 and c remain fixed. Moving upwards
and to the left along the production possibilities frontier from s'a
causes the wife's hours of work to decline steadily46 until at point a







froma to c', the wife's shadow wage rate rises because of the
assumption that c production is more time intensive than s production.47
The increase in the wife's shadow wage causes the price of c to rise
relative to the price of s and this is reflected in the curvature of
the constraint between a and c'.
The Willis model has four exogenous variables, V, w, T, and
•Unfortunately, without further assumptions the model has no
implication for the direction of the change in fertility for any given
change in one of the exogenous variables. Changes in V, w, T, and p,
produce income effects and alter and p5 .Oncethe income and
relative price effects are identified, the analysis of the model is
identical to that of the Becker model. However, the Becker model as we
have seen has no implications for fertility. In the Willis model a
change in a single exogenous variable often produces both income and
relative price effects and, in this case, the amalgam of changes, each
of which may be positively or negatively related to fertility, stifl
produces a fertility response whose direction is indeterminant. None-
theless, the framework of the model is quite useful and Willis has been
able to extrac1 from it quite a plausible explanation of observed
cross—sectional fertility differentials. This explanation will be
discussed in connection with Model IVbelow.48
A Standard Demand Theory Version of the Willis Model
The ambiguity with regard to implications for fertility in
the Willis Model has two roots: the specification of the utility— 35—
functionand the specification of the production structure. It is
helpful in understanding the Willis model to separate the influences
of these two segments of the structure and to consider a modified
model with the production structure of the Willis model and the utility
formulation of Model II above. This model may be written
Model IV: A Willis—type Model Which Treats Each
Child Separately
(31) Maximize U =f(c1,c2,...,c,s)




(36) T=t + t +t
i=l Cj
(37) V + w p(x5 +x)
Assumptions: (i) G( )andH( )arehomogeneous of degree one;
(ii) H( )ismore time intensive than G( );49
50 (iii) s and C1throughcare tormal goods;
where c is the output of childservices from the i—th child, t
is thewife's timespent on the i—th child, and x1 is the quantity
ofgoodsspent on the i—th child. Otherwise, all the variables are
defined as above for the Willis model. As in the Willis model, it is
assumedthat C andII arehomogeneous of degree one and that the— 36—
productionof childservices is more intensive in the wife's timethan
isthe production of s .However,ModelIVmakestheadditional, assump-
tion that the production functions for childservices are independent of
parity. This is an assumption whose merits can scarcely go unquestioned.5'
Nonetheless, as a simplification which aids us in understanding the
Willis model it is quite useful.
Model IV combines the endogeneous relative prices of the
Willis model with the utility function of Model II. Once the income and
relativeprice effects due to some change in the exogenous variables
are determined, the analysis of Model IV becomes identical to the
analysis of Model II. In Model IV, the constraint facing the house-
hold may be written
(38) V + wT =Pccl+ pc2 + ...+PcCm +
(39) where =wh(w,p)+ ph(w,p)
(40) and p =wg(w,p)+ pg(w,p)
This constraint differs from that in Model II only in that the income
concept is full income rather than money income and in that prices are
endogenous.The distinction between whether the wife is in or out of
thelabor force remains important in Model IV. Letusmake the following
definition:
(4l) cc +c +... +c
1 2 m
or, in words, c is equal to total childservices. Now the constraint
faced by the household may be simply written52— 37—
I
(42) V + wT = +pe
The constraint is identical to the constraint in the Willis model and
has nonlinear and linear segments as shown in Figure 8.
Because of the differences in the utility functions between
Model III and Model IV the latter has some implications for fertility. A
discussion of the implications of Model IV follows. If the wife is
in the labor force both before and after an increase in husband's
income, V, then this increase must cause fertility to increase or
remainconstant, but it cannevercause it to decline.An analogous
statementis also true for an increase in T
If the wife is in the labor force both before and after an
Increase in either V or T ,fullincome increases and relative
prices remain fixed.53 Thisis identical to the situation in Model II
where income increased and it was shown below that in that situation
fertility could not decrease and possibly could increase.54 If the
wife is Out of the labor force both before and after an increase in
V ,thenthe signof the change infertility is indeterminant. Why
arethe implications for fertility of an increase inV different
forwomen In and out of the labor market? They differ because if the
wife Is in the labor force an increase in V is essentially identical
to an increase in I in Model II. However,ifthe wife is not in the
laborforce and increase in V has both an income and a relative price
effect. This is due to a result knownas Rybczynski'sTheorem.55 For
our present purposes Rybczynski's Theorem states that if G( )and-38-
H( )areboth homogeneous of degree one, if H( )ismore timeinten-
sive than G( ),ifthe wife is not in the labor market and if
the family initially consumed at (s0c0) with the relative price ratio
PS— , then
PC p
i) increasing V ,therelative price ratio, ,willequal
P at a point (s1,c1) such that s > andc1 <c0;
p
ii) increasing T ,therelative price —willequal * at
a point (s2,c2) such that c2 >c0
and < Thismaybeseen
graphically in Figures 9 and 10.56 In Figure 9 the relative price
ratio, ps/p ,isidentical at points a and b .However,if the
familyinitially consumed at point a itcould not consume at point b
afterthe increase inV withoutviolating the assumption that c was
a normal good. All points on the constraint which do not violate this
normalityassumption must be above and tothe left of point b and
have arelative price ratio greater than he relative price ratios at
points a and b .'Therefore,ifc isa normal good its relative
price must increase as Vincreases.Thus, increasing Vhasan income
effect which cet. p.wouldcause fertility to increase and a relative
price effect which cet. 2!.•wouldcause fertility to decline and the
combinationof these two effects has an indeterminant sign.
In the case of increasing T ,boththe income and the relative
price effects work in the same direction, toward increasing fertility.
In Figure 10, which shows the effect of increasing T ,therelative
p
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initiallyconsumed at point a ,itcould not consume at point b after
the increase in T without violating the assumption that s was a
normal good. Therefore, all points consistent with the assumption that
ais a normal good must lie below and to the right of point b along
the constraint. At aU such points, however, the relative price ratio
'8 58 —mustbelower than it was at point a . Theincome effect and
PC
therelative price effect reinforce each other in this instance and
therefore fertility cannot fall.
If the wife is out of the labor force before and after an in-
crease in the market wage rate w' ,herfertility is unaffected by
that change. If the wife is in the labor market both beforeand after
anincrease in the market wage rate, the effect of this changeupon
fertility is indeterminant. The increase in the wife's market wage
has an income effect which cet. .would(by assumption) cause
fertility to increase. flowever, the increase in w',causesc to
rise relative to p5t,59 and other things being equal, this, inturn,
would cause a decline in fertility and the resultant of these two
forces acting in opposite directions is of indeterminant sign.
From considerations similar to these Willis derives an empiri-
cally testable "mixture model" of fertility which he uses to explain
nonlinearjties in observed cross—sectional fertility patterns.60 The
fundamental assertions of the "mixture model" are, cet.
i) the effect on fertility of increasing the husband's income
is greater (i.e. more positive or less negative) when the wife'swage
rate is higher than when it Is lower;— 41—
ii)the effect on fertility of increasing the wife'swage
rate is greater (i.e. more positive or less negative) when the husband's
income is lower than when it is higher.
The assertions which comprise the "mixture model" are notimplications
of either Model III or Model IV, but rather are plausibleinterpre-
tations of these models. Statement 1) is derived from the following
argument. Holding everything else constant increasing wives' wage rates
tends to increase wives' labor force participation rates.61 The effect
of an increase in the husband's income has a positive effecton fer-
tility if the wife is in the labor force and an ambiguous effect if
she is not. It is plausible, although not certain, that the effect
of an increase is V on fertility is smaller if the wife is not in
the labor force than if she is. Indeed, it is quite plausible that the
effect of increasing V Is to increase the fertility when the wife
is in the labor force and to decrease it when she Is not. If It is
true that the effect on fertility of increasing V is greater when the
wife is in the labor market then when she is not, then the impact of
an increase in V is greater the greater the wive's labor force par—
ticipation rate.
Statement ii) is derived from the following argument. Holding
everything else constant, increasing husband's incomes causes wives'
labor force participation rate to decrease.62 Increasing the wives'
wage rates only affects the fertility of women in the labor market.
If increasing wives' wage rates causes fertility to decline thenas
wives' labor force participation rates decrease, due to increasesin V ,— 42—
I
itis likely the negative effect of increasing w would diminish. In
the extreme case where wives' labor force participation rates were zero
there would be no negative effect at all. Nonlinearities in fertility
differentials of the sort described in statements i) and ii) have been
63 found in a wide array of fertility data.
The implications sketched above would be essentially identi-
cal to the considerations in the Willis model for determining fertility
if c entered the utility function as a normal good and fertility was
assumed to vary directly with c .However,c does not enter the
utility function at all; in its place are the separate arguments n
and e .Theadded difficulty involved in such an approach, discussed
above in terms of the Becker model, turns all the sign implications of
the Model IV into ambiguous results and complicates the ambiguity of
those situations irr which the sign implications for fertility are already
unclear. Thus entertaining the Becker form of the utility function as
opposed to a utility structure which treats each child as a separate
entity has a substantial cost within the context of the Willis model.
One would exepct' economists to accept it only if there was some sub—
stantial benefit from doing so. To date, the existence of such bene-
fits remains to be established.
There are clearly a number of facets of the Willis model which
can be elaborated and extended. However, sociologists frequently argue
that there is one particular portion of the model which is not in need
of elaboration or extension, but rather a candidate for removal: the
utility function. The core of this objection may be separated into two— 43—
parts.The first half of the objection is thatfertilitycontrol is
not perfect and parents often complete their childbearing years with
a number of children different from their preferrednumber.64 The
second half of the objection is that people not choose their pre-
ferred number of children in a manner which seems rational or cons is—
tent from the point of view of an economic decision—makingmodel.65
Acceptance of the latter conetntion, it should be noted, would under-
Cut Leibenstein's approach no less than Becker's ——thepresence of
some significant degree of implicit sociology in both formulations
notwithstanding.
The first objection can be eliminated within the framework
of models of utility—maximizing behavior by assuming that families
choose a contraceptive strategy rather than directly choosing a number
of children.66 The normative model then involves maximization of the
family's exepcted utility over possible contraceptive strategies. This
formulation may satisfy the first objection, but it certainly would not
satisfy the second. In orderto satisfy the second objection altogether
another framework for analysis is needed.
Modelling Fertility Behavior Without the Utility Maximization Hypothesis
There is another framework in which models of household pro-
duction may fruitfully be viewed and which satisfies the second objec-
tion. That framework includes a statistical representation of the
behavior of a group of households. I have shown elsewhere67 thatit—44—
is possible to develop a demand theoretic structure forgroup behavior
which did not presume that individual consuming units maximizeda
utility function or acted according to a consistent set of preferences.
In order to accomplish this, assumptions about distributions ofpurchases
and how they change when economic conditions changewere substituted
for assumptions about individuals' maximizing behavior.
Let us now consider another model of fertility which makes
use of the household production framework; this time a statistical
model of aggregate fertility behavior which does notassume anything
about the utility functions of individual families. First however,
some introductory comments are needed.
Standard demand theory envisions a single household making
choices subject to a constraint. These models, then, have two main
parts, the constraint and the representation of the individual'spre-
ferences. All the four models of fertility which have been discussed
above are of this nature. The statistical model offertility behavior
which shall be considered below envisions a large number ofhouseholds,
all of whom are subject to the same constraint.Using Model IV as an
example, in Figure 1]. the standard demand analysis Is concerned with
how much c and s a single household will chooseto consume':when it
is subject to the constrainta1a2a3 .Ifthe household chooses a
point on the arc a1a2 the wife will not participate in the labor market.
If the household chooses a point on the linesegment a2a3 ,thenthe
wife will participate in the labor market. Incontrast, the statistical
model of fertility behavior considers alarge number of households—45—
distributed along the constraint. In general, there will be some house-
holds in which the wife participates in the labor market and some in
which she does not. Each household, though, consumes a particular
combination of s and c .Letus suppose that there are m house-
holds whose consumption bundles are located at various points along the
constraint. The quantities of s and c consumed may be ordered from
the largest to the smallea so that
5 > 5 > ...>S 1—2——m
and
c >c >...>c 1—2— —m
We denote the ordered set of the s by {s} and the ordered set of the
c1 by {c} and call them the distribution of s and the distribution of
c respectively.
The distributions of s and c may be represented graphically
by their distribution (or cumulative density) functions. Figure 11 shows
a constraint and its associated distribution of c •68In Figure 11,
d1 is the proportion of families, subject to the constraint a1a2a3
which are childless. Generally, for any given quantity of childservices
consumed, say c2, the distribution function tells what percentage of
the families subject to the constraint consume a quantity of childservices
less than or equal to c2 .Thusin Figure 1]- f percent of the house-
holds in question consume a quantity to c less than or equal toc2
Since all women for whom c <c2are in the labor force, f is also
the wives' labor force participation rate. In Figure 11, a graph of,
— 46 —
FIgure11
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the distribution of s was not included, but it is logically no less
important than the distribution of c ;itcan be derived from the con-
straint and the distribution of c in this two—dimensional case.
The major difference between the standard demand theory model
and the new demand theory model being considered here is that the standard
demand theory model consists of a constraint and a representation of the
tastes of a single household, while the new demand theory model consists
of a constraint and representations of purchase distributions of a large
group of households. Standard demand theory does not get very far on
constraints and utility functions alone and it has become standard prac-
tice to assume that the arguments of the utility function are normal
goods. Similarly the new demand theory does not get very far until an
analogous normality assumption is made. Before such an assumption can
be made, however, we must make the following definition.
Definition of an increase in the opportunity to consume a household
commodity:
Let us consider a n—dimensional production possibilities curve,






where Z is the maximum amount of household commodity j which can
be produced by household k given the resources in situation I and
given that it also produces the quantities of the other household commodi-
ties specified as arguments in the L1 function. If (Z ...,p
—48—
(Zj_i,k) (Z.k) ...Z)is infeasible70 then Z is zero. If the
production possibilities curves in situations 1 and 2 differ such that
(2)> (2)
)Z—jk (Z.kjk
over all points (Z ... ...,Z)which are
feasible either in situation 1 or in situation 2
and
ii) thereexists some point (Z...,z9 ..., Z)
such that >(z < z)
thenwe say that the opportunity to consume household commodity j is
greater(smaller) in situation 2 than in situation 1
NormalityAssumption: Ifthe opportunity to consumeZ is greater
(smaller)in situation2than in situation1then
z>Z(Z< Z) for k =1,...,m
In essence, the normality assumption asks our forebearance
in the assertion that whenever theconstraint shifts upward and to the
right, the distribution functions of the quantities purchased of each
good also shift to the right.-.49—
Now we may state a household production model of fertility
behavior which does not assume that each family maximizes a utility
function.
Model V: A Model of Fertility Without Utility Maximization
(43) s =G(t5,x5)
(44) c =H(tc,xc,n)
(45) T=t +t +t C S £
(46) V + wt =p(x + x ) xc 5
Assumptions:(i) C and H are homothetic production functions,
(ii) H is more intensive in the wives' time than C
(iii) there are m households consuming at various
points along the households' production
possibilities frontier,
(iv) s and c are normal goods in the sense of
normality given above,
(v) wives' time and numbers of children are
complementary in the production of childservices.
Model V differs from the original Willis model in a number of
ways. The most obvious difference is that there is no utility function
in Model V. It has been replaced by the assumption that there are m
households consuming at various points on their production possibilities
frontier. Another difference is that in the Willis model G( )andH( )
wereassumed to be homogeneous of degree one while in Model V G( )andS—50—
I
H()arejust assumed to be homothetic production functions, a consider-
able generalization of the initial Willis specification.The childser—
vices production function here differs from that in theoriginal Willis
model in that here the childservjceg production functionincludes the
number of children, whereas in the Willis model thequantity of child—
servicesdid notdepend on the number of children. Indeed, inall four
previous models, it was assumed that holding the number of children
constant it was always possible to increase childservicesby any
tnulitpleso long as time and goods inputs into children were increased
bythat multiple. In these models it is never envisioned thatspending
ever more time andgoods on a fixed numberofchildren could ever lead
todiminishing returns. In the specification used in Model V, if G(;)
andH( )werehomoegeneous of degree one, a doubling,for example,
of c could be obtained by doubling the time andgoods spent on children
and the number of children; doubling the time andgoods spent on child-
ren without increasing the number would not double childservices,but
rather increase it by a smaller multiple.
Putting the number of children into the childservices produc-
tionfunction is not without some difficulty, however. Ifn isto be
treatedas an input, it must have a price either in terms of wives'
time, marketgoodsor both. The question then becomes, "how much does
a live birth cost in terms of market goods and the wife's time?"In
Model V, n appears in neither the wives' timeconstraint nor the
budget constraint. In other words, it is assumed that the timeand money
I—51—
costs of producing a live birth are zero. In reality of course, thisis
not the case, but I have excluded them from this particularmodel for
ease' of exposition. Further, I do not believe theirinclusion would
aid in the explanation of either time series trends or cross—sectional
differentials in fertility. This is not a crucial simplification,
however; the reader may easily produce the modifications needed to
treat both a time and a money cost of producing a live birth. Since,
in this model live births are costless, the production function H
must be one such that the marginal product of children can become zero
72
when n is within a plausible range.
The derived demand functions drawn from equations (43) and







of degree zero and
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restrictions, and hare homogeneous
where 4(s) and 'P(c) are strictly increasing
73
arguments.
and budget consgraints, equations (45) and (46) may
single equation as was done in equation (27) above.
(52) V +wT =c(s)(wg(w,p) + pg(w,p)) + 'P(c)(wh(w,p)+ PxhxPx—52—
and
(53) V + wT =(s)PS + 1'(c) PC
where pand are defined as in equations (25) and (26) above.
Clearly, if this constraint is interpreted asrelating s) and ''(c)
rather than s and c,itis identical to the constraint relatings
andcin the case of linear homogeneousproduction functions. Equa-
tion (53), which is graphicallyrepresented in Figure 8, hasalinear
segment for the situation in which women are in the labor forceand
a nonlinear segment covering the situation in whichwomen are not in
the labor force.
In Model V average fertility, in situation ,n,may
bewritten as follows
(54) j(i)=
h (wj1. i) 4I(CJ) j=1
where c (i) >(i)>... > 1—2— —m
andwherew is the (shadow) wage rate of the wife in thejth
family in situation I .Thewage rate is the market wage rate
if the wife is in the labor market; if sheis noç it is her shadow
wage rate.
Now let us consider the effect onfertility of an increase
in V .Thisis shown graphically in Figure 12.
In Figure 12, the constrainta1a2a3 is associated with the
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I
withthe distribution functione1e2e3 .Rybczynski'sTheorem74 tells
us that the point b2 must always be above and to the left of
a2
Since by the Normality Assumption, the distribution function
e1e2e3
can never lie to the left of the distribution function
d1d2d3 ,the
wives' labor force participation rate after theincrease in V ,2(2)
in Figure 12, must be below ,the-wives'labor force participation
rate before the increase in v .Inthe case of m discrete house-
holds it is only possible to show that the labor forceparticipation rate
of wives' cannot Increase when V increases.76
Let us suppose, then, that women are in the labor mar-
ket before the increase in V and that q(2)women are in the labor







where w' is the market wage rate.
The terms 1) and 2) are theaverage fertility analogs
of the Willis model concepts of thefertility of a woman who was in the
labor force both before and after an increase InV .Inthis case,
however, it is not necessary to assume that we have observedthe same
women both before and after an Increase in V.Evenif the same women
are observed the q(2) women considered incomputing r4'neednot be
in-55- .
thesame as those considered in computing 2).Itis important to
note that although 2) is the average fertility of women in the labor
force after an increase V ,t41 isnot the average fertility of
women in the labor force before the increase. Rather nj1 is the
average fertility of theq(2) women in the labor market with the
lowest values of c or what amounts to the same thing in this model,
the highest numbers of hours worked in the laborforce.78

















However,statement (59) follows directly from
(i) 'Y( )isa strictly increasing function of c
and
(2) (1) 79
(ii) c.>c. j=l,... ,m (because of the Normality Assumptiton ).
Thus,we have demonstrated that the average fertility of comparable groups
of women in the labor market increases as husbands' income increases.
This result is clearly similar to the result in Model IV, for increasing
V while the wife remains in the labor market.I
—56—
-InModel IV, it wasshownthat if the wife was not in the
labor force both before and after an increase in V ,theresulting
direction of the fertility change could not be predicted. A similar
statement concerning average fertility can be made for Model V. Let
be the number of women not participating in the larbor market at
the lower level of V and let r2 be the number not participating
at the higher level of V .Clearly,r2 >rW.Nowlet
(1)
(60) —(2)=r1jl h(w2,p) (c2))
—(1)—1 h (w ,p )IV(c. ) —
(1)Ln j x
r j=l
The average fertilities of comparable groups of women not in the labor
force before and after an increase in V , and2) ,respec-
tively, have no determinant relationship to one- another. In order to
see this clearly it is sufficient to note that
(i) ((2)) >((l)) since 2) >l)
k=1,...
(ii) h(w2< h(w,sincew2 >
The analysis of Model V can continue in the same vein until
it is shown that for every implication for fertility in Model IV is
matched by an analogous result for average fertility in Model V. Let
us consider next what happens when T is greater in situation 2 than
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InFigure 13 the axes in the upper panel are the reverse of what they
were in Figure 12. The constrainta1a2a3 is associated with the
distribution function d1d2d3 and the constraintb1b2b3 is associated
with the distribution function
e1e2e3
By Rybczynski's Theorem b2 must be above and to the left of
a2
Since e1e2e3 can never be to the left ofd1d2d3 ,thewives' labor
force participation rate in situation 2, which 100 —percent, must
be greater than 100 — percent, the wives' labor force participation
rate in situation 1. In the case of a discrete number of families, if T
is higher in situation 2 than in situation 1, then the wive's laborforce
participation rate must be at least as great in situation 2 as in situation 1.
Let qW be the number of women in the labor force in situation 1
and let q(2) be the number of women in the labor force in situation








(1) h(w', p) (c2))
q jm_qW+1
wherew' is the wives' market wage rate.
The observation that > followsdirectly from the Normality
Assumption which tells us that >c',j=1,... , in,andfrom the—59—
.
factc) is a strictly increasingfunction ofc •Thusthe average
fertility of comparably defined groups of women in the labor force never
decreases as T increases.
Let rW and r2 denote the numbers of women not in the













where w is the shadow wage of the wife in family j in situation i
It may be simply shown that(2) > II').Letus consider the kth
term in each of the summations. We know:




(ii)h(w, p) > h(w Since w2 <
Therefore 2) > .Forcomparably defined groups of women not in
the labor force, if T is greater in situation 2 than in situation 1 then
average fertility can be no lower in situation 2 than insituation 1.
The implications of Model V f or the signs of changes in average
fertility due to changes in the wives' market wage rate are again analogous
to the implications of Model IV. Let the wives' market wage rate be greater












































L: J ::;tItFiIir .:-:flT-..
—- —1_
ftJT •:: 1 • _1.mrr L•





Theconstraint a1a2a3a4 is associated with the distribution function
d1e1d2d3 and the constraint a1a2b3 is associated with the distribution
function d1e1e2e3
.Thedistribution function beneath that portion of
the constraint which does not shift cannot shift either.81 Thus both
situation 1 and 2 share the arc a1a2 on the constraint and the arc
d1e1 on the distribution function. Since point a2 must lie to the
right of a3 ,witha higher market wage rate, the wive's labor force
participation rate, 100 — percent must be greater than 100 —
percent, the wive's labor force participation rate when their market wage
rate is lower. In the case of a discrete number of families, increasing
the wage rate can never cause a decrease in their labor force
participation rate.
Let us suppose that in situation 1, with the lower wage rate,
women do not work and that in situation 2, r2 women do not work.
(1) (2) Clearly r >r .Inthis case it may easily be shown that
(2) (1)
(6)
r(2) jlhn(W2 (c) =
r2)j=lhn(W1 ((1))






In other words, equation (66) must be true because the first r2 points
on the constraints in both situations must be identical. We have just
shown that the average fertilities of comparably defined groups of women
who do not participate at either the higher or the lower wage rate remain
identical regardless of the wage rate change.—62—
Theaverage fertility of comparably defined groups of women
in the labor force may either be greater or smaller in situation 2 as
compared to situation 1. Let q(l) be the number of women who parti-
cipate in the labor market in situation 1 and q(2) be their number in












where is the market wage rate in period i and where w2 >
Itis impossible to determine whether is greater than, less than
orequal to because
(j)(2)> since2) >(1)for k =m—q+J,... ,m
and (ii) hw2,p)<hwW,p)since >
Thiscompletes the discussion of the implications OfModelV
We have just demonstrated that without the assumptionof
utilitymaximization itispossible to constructa household production
modelwhich comes to essentially the same conclusions as the original
Willis model. The maindifferencesbetween the Willis model and the
statisticalaggregate model presented here are:-63-
1. The Willis model assumes that a single household maximizes
its utility function whereas the present model deals with aggregates and
substitutes postulates on group behavior for the postulates on indivi-
dual behavior used in the Willis model.
2. The present model yields implications for changes in aver-
age behavior for discrete changes in the independent variables while
the Willis model yields implications for a single family's behavior for
infinitesimal changes in the independent variables.
3. More general homothetic production functions were used
in the present model as opposed to linear homogeneous production func-
tions in the Willis model.
That with all these changes the implications of the Willis model remain
essentially unchanged shows that the features of the production
ture embedded in the original Willis model give rise to conclusions
which are quite robust.
The Non—Utilitarian Model of Fertility: Some Future Developments
In addition to implications analogous to those of the Willis
model, Model V potentially has implications which go quite beyond any-
thing in the Willis model. Of all the models considered in this chapter
only Model V could have implications for changes in the partiy distri-
bution of fertility. The other models deal only with a single family so
that their parity distributions of fertility are nothing but single
points. In contrast, Model V deals with a large group of families; it—64—
p
envisionsa situation in which, given the same values of the exogenous
variables, some families will have many children, some will have a few,
and some will have none at all. Since marked changes over time have
been observed in parity distributions of fertility in the U.S., it
would be interesting to discover if the implications of Model V for
changes inthe parity distribution accord with the observed changes.
This isa new and complex topic whose full treatment would require a
separate monograph. Rather than treating it here, the derivation of
these implications shall be deferred until after the observed changes
in parity distributions have been discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
Another possible line of development of Model V is toward a
reinterpretation of the Easterlin—Fuchs intergenerational relative income
hypothesis. Since Model V allows for the consideration of discrete
changes in exogenous variables, we may use It as an intergenerational
model of fertility. Let us consider two situations, the first repre-
senting the lifetime economic conditions facing the parent generation
and the second representing the lifetime economic conditions facing their
children's generation. We assume that the husbands' real income and the
wives' real wage rate are higher in the children's generation than in
the parents;, but that the wives' time constraint is identical in both
generations. The production possibilities frontiers for the parents'
and the children's generations are shown below in Figure 15. As it
stands, this intergenerational model of fertility has no implications
for fertility either for women who are in the labor market or for those
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Thereason for this lack of implications is not because of a
change in tastes, for in Model V this would have to be manifested by a
violation of the Normality Assumption stated above. Rather, with the
Normality Assumption inviolate, the absence of implications arises
because increases in husbands' Income and the wives' wage rates gener-
ate conflicting income and substitution effects, both in the case where
the wife is in the labor market and in the case where she is not.82
Must the model be discarded as unilluminating, or is it possible to
obtain from it some reasonably firm implications about fertility behavior?
In order to obtain some implications, it Is necessary to say something
about the distributions of c and s and it is here that the inter-
generational relative income hypothesis plays a role.
The Easterlin—Fuchs intergenerational relative income hypo-
thesis suggests that young people's tastes and expectations regarding
their material standards of living are formed when they are adolescents
in their parents' households. For ease of exposition let us consider an
extreme form of this hypothesis which states that the distribution of
s in the children's generation depends the economic conditions they
experienced as adolescents, but not on their owneconomicconditions.83
If the economic conditions of the children's generation differ from
what they expected on the basis of their adolescent experiences, the
entire difference is absorbed by changes in their production of child—
services. Clearly in this extreme form, the Easterlin—Fuchs hypothesis
Is analogous to Friedman's permanent income hypothesis,84 with child—
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I
However,even given the extreme version of the Easterlln—Fuchs
hypothesis Model V is short on implications for intergenerational fertility
differentials. In order to see this let us consider the followingcon-
ceptual experiment. Let us consider dividing a cOhort of adults who
have had the same adolescent background into twogroups, one of which
experiences lower economic growth and therefore faces the lifetime con-
straint a1a5 and the other experiences more rapid economicgrowth and
This situation is shown in Figure 16.
therefore faces the lifetime constraintb1b5 ./ Ifthe distribution
of s is the same for both groups because their adolescentexperiences
were identical then the jth (kth) family (in the distribution of s )
wouldconsume at a2(a4) given the lower rate of economic growth and
at b (b )giventhe higher rate of economic growth. Nonetheless, the
model has no implications for fertility since without furtherrestric-
tions it is impossible to tell whether fertility is higheror lower
at b2(b4) than at a2(a4) since not only is(c) higher at b2(b4)
than at a2(a4) but the wives' wage rate is also higher atb2(b4) than
at a2(a4) .Thepositive income effect and the negative relative price
effect offset one another leaving no a priori sign for thechange in
fertility.
Thus even with the addition of the Easterlin—Fuchs hypothesis
in its extreme form Model V is not sufficiently articulatedto produce
implications for intergenerational fertility changes. Clearly, additional
specifications must be added to the model if it is to produce such impli-
cations. But which ones? Perhaps the best approach would beto consider
knowntemporaland cross—sectional fertility variations and totry to find.
—68—
restrictions on the model which cause it to reproduce those patterns of
variation. However, it was our original intent to discover what economic
modelsof fertility told usabout time series movements in fertility.
Clearly, we have come full circle. In order to make our models better,
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5.For example, see Grabill, Kiser and Wheipton (1958), PP. 274—277.
and Kiser, Crabill and Campbell (1968), PP. 208—212.
6.There are numerous findings U—shaped fertility—income relationships.
An interesting relatively early example canbefound in Ruggles
and Ruggles (1960). A more contemporary observation can be found in
Bernhardt (1972).
7. Leibenstein (1952) and Leibenstein (1957).
8.Okun (1958).
9.Leibenstein (1957), p. 161.
10.Leibenstein (1957), p. 162.
11.Leibenstein (1957), p. 162.
12.Particularly Easterlin (1961), Easterlin (1966) and Easterlin (1968).
13. Easterlin (1961). •")
14.Easterlin (1966).
15.This inverse relationship has been explored in a number of studies.
Particularly, Easterlin (1961) and Thomas (1972).
16.This hypothesis was first suggested in a remarkably prescient analysis
by Fuchs (1956).
17. Becker (1960).
18.Becker calls average real expenditure per child "child quality".
Generally, definitions are not subject to arguments pro and con but
this particular definition, I believe, is particularly misleading.
Among the general populace child quality is usually associated with
health, beauty, talent, certain pleasing personality traits, and other such—71—
18. (continued)
characteristics of children to which the contribution of real ex-
penditures is often quite minimal. Moreover, it is not generally
accepted that average real expenditure per unit is a particularly
good measure of quality for durable goods in general. Suppose two
people bought identical automobiles one of which wOrked beautifully
and th other of which was a lemon. The person who purchased the
lemon is likely to spend considerably more ntoney on his auto than
the person who bought the car which functioned perfectly. Yet, we
are hardly likely to say that the person who bought the lemon had
the higher quality automobile just because his real expenditureper
unit was higher than that of the other person. Indeed, we wouldsay
just the reverse.
Let us consider another example of how Becker's definition of
child quality could be misleading. Suppose someone had a profes-
sional photographer come to his home to take photographs of his
children and his automobile. Most people would not think that either
the quality of the car or the quality of the children would be en-
hanced thereby. Nonetheless, Becker's definition of child quality
and the quality of the automobile
would lead us to say that the quality of the children/increased be-
cause their pictures were taken. In footnote 38, we argue that the
confusion in terminology grows even worse in the context of models
of household production.
Economists have no monopoly on the study of fertility and if
they are to interact fruitfully with people in other disciplines it
is incumbent upon them to keep nonessential semantic difficulties—72-- .
toa minimum.Forthis reason, I do not accept Becker's definition
of child quality and until something better comes along whenever I
wish to say "average real expenditure per child" I shall use the
inelegant phrase "average real. expenditure per child."
19.Becker (1960), p. 214.
20.Becker andLewis(1973).
21.Becker and Lewis (1973), p. S28l fn. 1.
22. It is assumed in Model II thattheprice index for the child ex-
penditure bundle is invariant with respect to birth order.This is
not a crucial assumption of the model and its implications remain
intact even if the price index varies with parity.
23. A normal good is defined as one f or which the demand increases as
income increases if all the relevant relative prices are held con-
stant. There is one exception to this rule. If there was noneof
a good consumed before andafteran income increase, it still may
beconsidered a normalgood.
24.The reason that the two constraints both pass through the same point
is that waschosensuch that the point of tangency of equa-
tion (4) with an indifference was a point on equation (5).
25.The shadow prices of n anderelative to the -shadow price of
(2) (1)
s are pce/ps and r15 respectively. Since e ? e and
(2) (1)
. (2)
n >n ,bothrelative shadow prices must be higher at (n
(2) (2) . (1) (1) (1)
e ,s )alongequation 5 than at (n ,e ,s )along
equation 2.
26.By pure cross—substitution effect of a price change, we meanthe—73—
26. (continued)
effect on other goods of changing the price of one good while
holding utility constant.
27.Another way to understand why even changes in have an ambiguous
effect on fertility in the Becker model is to notice that if the
pure price elasticities with respect to simultaneous proportional
changesinthe shadow prices of n and e are not identical then
thedifferencesin the price elasticities cause induced relative
shadow price changes between n and e which could offset the
initial price change.
28.If both goods in the Becker model had a quality dimension then
there would be four argimiants in the utility function, thequantity
and quality of each of the two goods. In addition, there would be
threeendogenous shadow price ratios asopposed to two in the simpler
model. There would also be considerably greater difficulties because
the ambiguity is compounded by the interaction ofyet another vari-
able about which little is known a priori.
29.This result can simply be obtained by adding the first two equations
labeled (A13) in Becker—Lewis (1973), p. S286.
30.For example see Berkner and Mendels (1973).
31.The most common form of differentiation betweensiblings was on the basis
of sex. Traditionally, only males were sent tocollege while their






35. Becker and Lewis (1973).
36.Models IV and V below are such models. The discussion of Model IV
begins on page 34.
37.Assumption ii) may be restated as follows: given any values of the
wife's wage rate and the price of goods the ratio of wife's time to
market goods used in the production of c is greater than the ratio
of wife's time to goods used in the production of S.
38.Willis follows Becker and calls e child quality. However, this
term is quite misleading in the context of a model of household
production. Although it is convenient to speak of household pro-
duction functions and a household production structure, the activ-
ities of the household which are represented in this fashion partake
both of the character of production activities and consumption ac-
tivities. Suppose parents take their children to a park on a Sunday
for the purposes of admiring the scenery, drinking in some sunshine
and playing with their children in the park environment. Some of the
value of the parents' time spent at the park would be correctly allo-
cated to the childservices production function, as would a portion
of the cost of transporting the family to the park. Nonetheless, it
isquite confusing to claim that child quality has increased just
because theparents have played with their children. We do not claim
that the quality of phonograph records increases as they are played
more and more. We do not claim that the quality of an automobile
increases as it is driven more miles. Why should we assume that all
.—75—
38. (continued)
time and goods spent on children increase child quality? But then
again perhaps children are not like other consumer durables. See fn. 18.
39.The model is meant to be a one—period lifetime model of fertility
where T is the length of a couple's married life together.
40.To avoid confusion, the wife's market wage rate is denoted w' and
the wife's shadow wage rate when she does not participate in the labor
market is denoted w*. In those contexts where either wage concept
may be appropriate the symbol w is used.
hours
The implicit assumption is that the wife is free to work any number of /
shechooses at the market wage rate w'. If the wife's wage rate rose
as her lifetime hours of work rose, this would complicate the model,
but would not change its thrust. See Willis (1973), p. 38
41.The derived demand functions are simply functions which tell us the
cost minimizing input mix for any quantity of output and any set of
relative factor prices. In the case of production functions which
are homogeneous of degree one, these derived demand functions must
be multiplicative in output and a function of relative prices. If
it were not mutiplicative then the ratio of factor inputs would de-
pend on the scale of output and that cannot be the case for any
homogeneous production function.
42.It must be true that ht, and h are homogeneous of degree
zero because the cost minimizing quantities of inputs demanded de-
pends only on relative prices not the absolute level of prices. This
is just one of the restrictions on the functions of the input prices.
I—76—
42. (continued) •)
Anotherrestriction, for example, would be that g(w(),p) <
(2) (1) (2)
g(w ,p)whenever w >w .Clearlythere are more re-
strictions on these functions, but this need not concern us here.
43. See page 14:
44. In the Becker model I, PC' andp5are fixed exogenous variables.
In the Willis model the exogenous variables are V, w', and
The values ofI, p and p in that model depend on the values of
V, w, and and in that sense are endogenous.
45.The constraint facing the household maybewritten as
(1) V + w'T =s(w'g(w' + pg(w' + c(w'h(w' +
+ ph(w'
ifthe wife is in the labor force. If the wife is not in the labor
force the following two constraints must be satisfied simultaneously.




46.An expression for the wife's hours of labor market work may be derived
from equations 13, 15, 17, and22.First, solving for Cinequation
22 we obtain





Substituting the values of t and t from equations 15 and 17
into equation 13 and solving fort, we obtain
(2) t =T—sg(w',p)
—cht(w',p)
Substituting the value of c derived above in equation 1 into
equation 2, we obtain the following expression for t
=
wtht(w,p )+ph(wt ,p )(T(Pxhx(w' ,p))— V(ht(w',p ))+
+ —h(w',p)g(w',p)]]
Now, we cananswerthe question of whether tincreases or de-
creases with s. The wife's timeinthe labor force mustincrease
as &productionincreases (holding w' constant) because the co-
efficient of a in equation 3 must be positive. Thepositivity of
the coefficient of a would follow if
(4) sx(w',p)ht(w',P) —h(w'p)g(w' ,p )> 0
However, equation (4) mustbetrue because of the timeintensity






whichis sufficient to prove (4).46. (continued)
It is also useful to note at this point that the value of s at
point a in figure 8, the point at which the wife stops (starts)





48. See pages 40—42.
49. See footnote 37.
50. See footnote 23.
51.It is not strictly necessary in Model IV to assume that the produc-
tion functions for childservices are independent of parity. Hicks—
nuetral technological differences between production functions for
different parities can be assumedwithoutaltering the analysis.
Theassumption made inthe text that production functions for child-
services are independent of parity is made purely for expositional
ease.
52.The flows of childservices from the mpossiblechildren may be
aggregated into a single composite codity cbecausesince the
shadow price of childservices does not vary across parities, the
flowsc1,... ,cmeettheconditionsfor Hicks' composite com-
moditytheorem. See Hicks (1962)
53.The relative price of s and c only depend on the ratio of the
wife's wage to the price of goods. If the latter is constant so is
the former.—79—
'
54. See pages 22 and 23.
55. Rybczynski (1955)..
56. It is important to note that Rybczynski's Theorem holds in particu-
lar for the points of transition between the linear and nonlinear
portions of the constraint. An algebraic representation of s at
the point of transition,which illustrates Rybczynski's Theoremcan
be found in equation 6 in footnote 46.
57.This line of reasoning utilizes the fact that along the nonlinear
portion of the constraint p5/pfalls as a increases. See
Samuelson (1949).
58. See footnote 57.
59.Increasing w' relative to p must causep to rise relative to
pif c production is more time intensive than s production.
See Samuelson (1949).
60.Willis (1973), pp. S41—S53.
61.This familiar result is proved in the context of Model V onpage 61.
62.This familiar result is proved in the context of Model V onpage 54.
63.For example Ruggles andRuggles(1960), Table Al.
64.See Buinpass and Westoff (1970) for a brief discussion of the prevalence
of "unwanted" children.
65.Blake (1968). See particularly pp. 15—17.
66.This has already been done in a study by Michael andWillis(1973).
67.Sanderson (1974).
68.The distribution of s is implied by the distribution of c and
the constraint. In figure 11, d1 is the proportion of families
who have no children. Since as figure 11 is drawn the distribution—80—
68. (continued)
of c reaches 1007 at d2, Lt indicates that no families consume
more childservices than c* nor less s than s.
69.By situation i, we simply mean some fixed configuration of income
and prices. Situation 1 may differ from situation 2, for example,
if the wives' wage rates differ.
70.A point Z±k
,z)is infeasible
in situation i if given the resources available in situation i,
it is impossible to produce those quantities of the household com-
modities.
71. Since, in reality, we usually deal with a finite number of families,
assumption
we have written the normality/in terms consistent with this observa-
tion. However, it usually is more aesthetically pleasing to draw
the figures on the basis of a continuous distribution of families.
To put the normality assumption in terms of continuous distribution
functions, let us consider twodistributionfunctions F0( )and
F2( )definedover the closed interval [o,a]. The normality
assumption may now be restated:
ifthe opportunity to consume isgreater (smaller) in





existssome value of Z in the interval [o,a], say
such that F2 (Z) <(l)(Z) (F2 (Z()
>
In this definition F(1) is the distribution function for situation i.
.—81—
72. It is not beyond belief that, holding other inputs into child—
services fixed, the number of children which parents have is such
that the contribution of an additional child to the production of
childservices would be negative.
73.In order to understand why () andV( )mustbe strictly in-
creasing functions of their arguments, let us consider the implica-
tions of that not being so. Suppose s > and =
Thatwould imply that it is possible to produce more output with
no increase in inputs which would be inconsistent with G being a
production function.
74.See pages 37 and38.
75.Allthefollowing figures are drawn on the assumptions that i) the
wives' labor force participation rate lies between zero andunity,
andii)the distribution function never has a slope of aero except
at 100%.
76.In the case of a finite number of discrete households it is possible
that there exist sufficiently small changes in the exogenous vari-
ables such that the number of women in the labor force does not
change.
77.Generally speaking, since the ordering of the families can change
between situation 1 and situation 2, the same women need not be in
the labor force in both periods. However, since people only have
one lifetime, it is impossible to observe the same family before
and after changes in lifetime exogenous variables.
78.This may be clearly seen from equation 3 in footnote 46.
I—82—
79.When V increases the opportunity to consume c increases and
therefore, by the Normality Assumption (2) >C1for
=1,...
(2) (1)





on pages 37—39) and since there is a one to one positive association
between the wives' shadow wage and the relative price of c See.
Samuelson (1949).
81.The distribution beneath the portion of the constraint which does
not shift because if it did it would necessarily violate either the
Normality Assumption as it applies to c or as it applies to s.
82.Below, the conflicting income and substitution effects which arise
when the wife is out of the labor force have been discussed in some
detail. Conflicting income and substitution effects now arise even
when the wife is in the labor force because we have assumed that
the children's generation has both a higher husband's income and a
higher wives' wage rate than the parents' generation.
83.In essence this assumption states that the distribution of s in
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